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THE MERRILL DOCTRINE AND FEDERALLY REINSURED
CROP INSURERS
CHAD G. MARZEN*

ABSTRACT
Since 1947, the Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill decision has
operated to bar claims of equitable estoppel against agents of the federal
government. However, the applicability of the Merrill doctrine to the
equitable estoppel and waiver claims of insureds against federally reinsured
private crop insurers is unclear. There is a split of authority on this
significant issue, and it remains largely unresolved in numerous
jurisdictions.
An early trend developed where the courts applied the Merrill doctrine
to alleged misrepresentations of agents of the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (“FCIC”) as well as the agents of private insurers. In the early
to mid-2000s, the decisions of three state courts—Kentucky, Georgia and
Tennessee—declined to extend the shield of the Merill doctrine to federally
reinsured private crop insurers. Most recently, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, in the Skymont Farms v.
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. decision, revived life into Merill and held it
applied involving a federally reinsured crop insurance policy.
This article recommends a rule that could balance both the interests of
farmer insureds and federally reinsured private crop insurers in future cases
involving the Merrill doctrine. It proposes that (1) a heavy presumption
against the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private crop insurers
be followed, and (2) that Merrill only apply when a federally reinsured
private crop insurer makes a “clear and convincing” evidentiary showing
that the farmer insured failed to adequately investigate the provisions
concerning a crop insurance policy, or that Merrill only apply when there is
a “clear and convincing” evidentiary showing that the insured made a
fraudulent misrepresentation on an application for insurance.

* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Florida State University, College of Business –
Department of Risk Management/Insurance, Real Estate and Legal Studies. The author can be
reached at cmarzen@fsu.edu. The author would like to especially thank the North Dakota Law
Review for the kind opportunity to present this paper at the University of North Dakota School of
Law in April 2014.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Crop insurance continues to stand as a topic in the public spotlight.
The federal crop insurance program, a vital source of support for the toil
and efforts of America’s farmers since the Great Depression,1 faces an
uncertain future in the years ahead as a number of policymakers have
proposed significant reforms to the program. Within the past year, several
policymakers have proposed reforms to the program that would cap the
amount of subsidies a farmer can receive from the program and bar
subsidies to any farmer with an adjusted gross income above a certain
1. For a more extensive discussion of the background, history and key elements of the
federal crop insurance program, see Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection for
America’s Farmers, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 619 (2013) (hereinafter “Marzen I”); Steffen N.
Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Waste Land’: Defining a Justified Federal Role in Crop Insurance, 72
N.D. L. REV. 505 (1996); David A. Domina, Federal Crop Insurance: What It Means and How It
Works, NEBRASKA LAW. 2012.
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level.2 Occasional allegations of fraud within the program have also
surfaced in recent months and years.3 One major case within the past year
in North Carolina allegedly involved potential fraud of nearly $100 million,
which purportedly involved a number of insurance brokers, adjusters, and
farmers.4 With the new farm bill still currently stalled in the halls of the
United States Congress, the philosophical debate concerning the role of the
federal government as a subsidizer of crop risks in agriculture will
undoubtedly continue.
In North Dakota, sixteen different private insurance companies
currently provide federally reinsured crop insurance policies to farmers
throughout the state.5 The North Dakota Supreme Court has confronted
cases involving crop insurance for over one hundred years. One of the first
reported cases concerning insurance on crops, Berglund v. State Farmers’
Mutual Hail Insurance Co. of Waseca, Minnesota was decided by the North
Dakota Supreme Court over a century ago in 1913.6 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling for a plaintiff on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case to determine fact issues
concerning alleged misrepresentations concerning the plaintiff’s purported
insurable interest in the crop under the policy.7 Since Berglund, courts in
North Dakota have held that the Federal Crop Insurance Act does not
completely preempt state law claims based upon breach of contract,
2. Brian Wingfield, Crop Insurance Critics Make Push to Curb U.S. Subsidies, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Sept. 12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/crop-insurance-backers-stepup-lobbying-to-blunt-critics html.
3. David J. Lynch, Fraud Stealing $100 Million Shows Flaws in U.S. Crop Insurance,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-11/fraud-stealing
-100-million-shows-flaws-in-u-s-crop-insurance html. For more information concerning the legal
issues concerning crop insurance fraud, see Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Fraud and
Misrepresentations: Contemporary Issues and Possible Remedies, 37 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 675 (2013) (hereinafter “Marzen II”); see also U.S. v. Torlai, 728 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.
2013) (upholding conviction of individual convicted by jury of sixteen counts of allegedly making
false claims for agricultural benefits).
4. Lynch, supra note 3.
5. U.S Dep’t of Agriculture Risk Mgmt. Agency, Crop Insurance Providers: North Dakota
for 2013 (Jul. 25, 2013),
http://www3.rma.usda.gov/tools/agents/companies/2013/north_dakotaCI.cfm. The sixteen private
insurance companies which provided federally reinsured crop insurance policies in North Dakota
for 2013 include: ACE American Insurance Company; Agrinational Insurance Company, Inc.;
American Agri-Business Insurance Company; American Agricultural Insurance Company;
Everest Reinsurance Company; Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa; Great
American Insurance Company; GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company; Hudson Insurance
Company; John Deere Insurance Company; NAU Country Insurance Company; Occidental Fire &
Casualty Company of North Carolina; Producers Agriculture Insurance Company; Rural
Community Insurance Company; Starr Indemnity & Liability Company; and XL Reinsurance
America, Inc. Id.
6. 142 N.W. 941 (N.D. 1913); see also Marzen II, supra note 3, at 690.
7. Berglund, 142 N.W. at 943; see also Marzen II, supra note 3, at 690.
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negligence, and misrepresentations,8 that a two-year statute of limitations
relating to claims against licensed insurance agents applies in a case
involving allegations of negligence concerning handling of crop insurance
claims,9 and have examined bad faith in the context of a crop insurance
claim.10 North Dakota remains a national leader in the development of the
law concerning crop insurance claims, and the state’s national prominence
in agriculture11 portends a future of many more legal issues unique to crop
insurance being resolved in state courts.
While the number of crop insurance claims inevitably vary from season
to season, in September 2013, the United States Department of Agriculture
released figures that indicated farmers in the United States filed claims on
approximately six times more land than in the prior planting season.12 The
presence of an enlarged number of claims in more recent months has an
increasing number of commentators taking note of the significant legal
issues facing crop insurance litigation.13 As eighteen different private crop
insurance companies today provide federally reinsured crop insurance to
farmers,14 these companies all face potential liability exposures in the event
of a dispute regarding the circumstances surrounding a federally reinsured
crop insurance policy.
Amidst all of the issues in crop insurance litigation, a significant issue
remains largely unresolved in many jurisdictions and is subject to a current
split in authority: does the Merrill Doctrine15 (the doctrine that allows the
federal government to disavow a government agent’s unauthorized acts)16
8. Bullinger v. Trebas, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (D.N.D. 2003).
9. Overboe v. Farm Credit Serv. of Fargo, 2001 ND 58, ¶ 17, 623 N.W.2d 372, 377.
10. See Seifert v. Farmer’s Union Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1993).
11. See Dean J. Haas, Falling Down on the Job: Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a No
-Fault to a Worker-Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 208 (2003) (describing North Dakota as
a “penultimate agriculture state”); Jennifer J. Mattson, North Dakota Jumps on the Agricultural
Disparagement Law Bandwagon By Enacting Legislation to Meet a Concern Already Actionable
Under State Defamation Law and Failing to Heed Constitutionality Concerns, 74 N.D. L. REV.
89, 89 (1998) (describing North Dakota as an “agricultural powerhouse”).
12. Whitney McFerron & Jeff Wilson, U.S. Crop-Insurance Claims Jump Amid Planting
Delays, USDA Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013
-09-17/u-s-crop-insurance-claims-jump-amid-planting-delays-usda-says.html.
13. See J. Grant Ballard, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Litigation of Federally Reinsured
Crop Insurance Claims, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 531 (2013) (hereinafter “Ballard I”); Grant
Ballard, Representing Farmers in Crop Insurance Disputes: When Your Client is Denied the
Farm Safety Net, 48 ARKANSAS LAWYER, Summer 2013, at 26; Domina, supra note 1; Marzen I,
supra note 1.
14. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture Risk Mgmt. Agency, Crop Insurance Providers List for 2014
(Jul. 25, 2013), http://www3 rma.usda.gov/tools/agents/companies/indexCI.cfm.
15. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (hereinafter “Merrill”).
16. David K. Thompson, Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 551 (1979) (“Traditionally, courts have not permitted estoppel of the government, no matter
how compelling the circumstances.”).
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apply to bar the estoppel and waiver claims of insureds against federally
reinsured crop insurance companies? Suppose, hypothetically, that a wheat
farmer procures a crop insurance policy and the farmer is uncertain of the
meaning of a provision in the policy. Justifiably relying upon the expertise
of either an agent of a private crop insurer or an agent of the FCIC, the
wheat farmer takes an action that ultimately results in a loss of coverage
under the policy. Even despite the faulty advice of either the private crop
insurer agent or FCIC agent, can the private crop insurer be insulated from
liability by disavowing the agents’ actions? The outcome of this question
in courts throughout the country may have a significant effect on the claims
of farmer insureds.
This article examines the issue of whether the Merrill doctrine should
apply in cases involving federally reinsured crop insurance companies. Part
I provides an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s Merrill
decision and an overview of the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel
in insurance law. Part II discusses the reported cases to date that have ruled
on the application of the Merrill doctrine in the context of federal crop
insurance. Two early federal cases, the Mann v. Federal Crop Insurance
Corp.17 case in 1983 and Walpole v. Great American Insurance
Companies18 in 1994, led to the development of an early trend where courts
applied the Merrill doctrine to alleged misrepresentations of FCIC agents as
well as the agents of private insurers. In the early to mid-2000s, this trend
reversed in an opposite direction. The Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Dailey v. American Growers Insurance,19 the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Rain & Hail Insurance Services, Inc. v. Vickery,20 and the Tennessee Court
of Appeals in Simms v. Insurance Co. of North America21 all declined to
apply the Merrill doctrine. However, the application of the Merrill doctrine
in the context of federal crop insurance is far from a settled issue. Most
recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, in the Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp.
decision, revived life into Merrill and held that it applied in a case
involving a federally reinsured crop insurance policy.22
Finally, Part III analyzes the policies and issues concerning application
of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured private crop insurers. The
article proposes that the courts adopt a heavy presumption against applying
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983).
914 F. Supp. 1283 (D.S.C. 1994).
103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003).
618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005).
No. 4:09-cv-65, 2012 WL 1193407 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2012).
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the Merrill doctrine in cases involving federally reinsured crop insurers. It
contends that the Merrill doctrine should only apply in cases where the
FCIC or federally reinsured crop insurer make a “clear and convincing”
evidentiary showing that a farmer insured failed to properly investigate the
provisions concerning a crop insurance policy and/or the surrounding
circumstances associated with a crop insurance claim. The adoption of a
heavy presumption against the application of the Merrill doctrine by the
courts will better allow farmer insureds to recover in cases where a farmer
insured properly conducts due diligence surrounding a claim but is misled
by the alleged misrepresentations, whether innocent or intentional, of either
an FCIC agent or agent of a private crop insurer. As a policy matter, a
heavy presumption against the application of the Merrill Doctrine should
apply because claims arising under crop insurance policies in many cases
implicate the very economic livelihood of farmers.
II. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORP. V. MERRILL AND THE
WAIVER AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES IN
INSURANCE LAW
As a general doctrinal rule, employers are held liable for the negligent
acts and/or omissions of their employees and agents through the doctrine of
respondeat superior in agency law.23 Prior to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Merrill, it was a relatively unsettled question as to
whether the same rule applied to federal government agencies with respect
to agents of the federal government. Prior to 1980, the federal government
issued all federal crop insurance policies through the FCIC.24 Merrill stood
as a controlling decision in crop insurance litigation for decades, as the
FCIC remained the most significant entity providing crop insurance in the
United States.
A. THE MERRILL DECISION
The facts of the Merrill case began with copartners that applied for
federal crop insurance to insure wheat crops in Idaho in early 1945. 25 The
county Agricultural Conservation Committee acted as agent of the FCIC.26
The copartners informed the conservation committee that a large majority
of the acres on which they were planting spring wheat were reseeded as
23. RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, SMITH & ROBERSON’S BUSINESS LAW 36869 (15th ed. 2012).
24. Bullinger v. Trebas, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (D.N.D. 2003); Marzen I, supra note 1,
at 626.
25. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382 (1947).
26. Id.
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winter wheat acreage, and the conservation committee informed them that
the entire crop was insurable.27 In an unfortunate turn of events for the
copartners, however, not only was the majority of the spring wheat crop
destroyed by drought, but the crop was not insurable because of the
reseeding.28 The FCIC denied the copartners insurance claim, and litigation
ensued.29
At the trial, the copartners contended that the committee misled them
into believing that the entire spring wheat crop was insurable.30 In
response, the FCIC argued that wheat crop insurance regulations barred
recovery for the copartners as a matter of law.31 The trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs on the claim, and the Supreme Court of Idaho
affirmed, adopting the reasoning that the Agricultural Conservation
Committee, as agent of the FCIC, could bind the FCIC, irrespective of their
statements that were inconsistent with the wheat crop insurance regulations
in place.32
The United State Supreme Court reversed the Idaho Supreme Court
and found in favor of the FCIC.33 In its decision, the Court adopted more of
a caveat emptor34 type of approach to individuals and entities entering into
contracts with the government. In states that adhere to the caveat emptor
doctrine with regard to real estate transactions, buyers of property who later
find out the property is defective in some way are precluded from recovery
in contract if they failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would
have discovered the defect in the absence of fraud by the seller.35 Similar to
a buyer of real property who may incur risks associated with the purchase
of property, the Court in Merrill noted that individuals who enter into “an

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 382-83.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Caveat emptor is from Latin meaning “let the buyer beware.” It is defined as: “A
doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their own risk.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (8th ed.
2004).
35. Alex M. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons
Learned from the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 102 (1988)
Essentially, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not require a seller to
disclose defects and precludes recovery by a buyer for structural and other defects in
the property being sold where: (1) the alleged defective condition is open to
observation and is discoverable upon a reasonable inspection; (2) the buyer has the
opportunity to examine the premises; and (3) there was no fraud on the part of the
vendor with respect to the condition of the premises.
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arrangement” with the government take the risk that agents of the
government stay within their authority.36
In ruling for the FCIC, the Court in Merrill also remarked that
individuals and entities have constructive notice37 of all federal statutory
regulations in effect.38 Thus, the Court found the copartners held
constructive notice of the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations.39 Even the
case of “innocent ignorance,” if it results in adversity, would be insufficient
for recovery.40 The Supreme Court stated:
Accordingly, the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations were binding
on all who sought to come within the Federal Crop Insurance Act,
regardless of actual knowledge of what is in the Regulations or of
the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance . . . The ‘terms and
conditions’ defined by the Corporation, under authority of
Congress, for creating liability on the part of the Government
preclude recovery for the loss of the reseeded wheat no matter with
what good reason the respondents thought they had obtained
insurance from the Government.41
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Merrill appeared to
downplay the observation that the FCIC agent allegedly misled the
insureds, despite the presence of the official regulations that were in effect.
From the date of the decision in Merrill to 1980, Merrill essentially covered
all cases of alleged negligence and misrepresentations by the FCIC and
FCIC agents concerning crop insurance coverage. Merrill has since been
expanded to a number of areas involving allegations of misleading
statements and actions of federal agents, including alleged misleading
statements concerning Social Security benefits,42 military housing
benefits,43 medicare cost reimbursement procedures,44 and payment-in-kind
contracts between individuals and the Commodity Credit Corporation.45
36. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384 (“Whatever the form in which the Government functions,
anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his
authority stays within the bounds of his authority.”).
37. “Constructive notice is notice which the law deems sufficient to apprise the world of a
fact.” Jeffrey H. Sussman, An Imperfect Answer to a Question of Perfection: The 1993
Amendment to California Civil Code Section 2924H(C) and the Avoidability of Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Sales Under Sections 544(A)(3), 549, and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 22 CAL.
BANKR. J. 287, 296 (1995).
38. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-85.
39. Id. at 385.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Cheers v. Sec’y of HEW, 610 F.2d 463, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1980).
43. See Brant v. United States, 597 F.2d 716, 720 (Cl. Ct. 1979).

2013]

THE MERRILL DOCTRINE

593

While Merrill still has an expansive reach in a number of areas, the
federal crop insurance program changed in 1980. Following the Federal
Crop Insurance Act (“FCIA”) of 1980, the program expanded to include
private crop insurers who could underwrite crop insurance policies and then
receive the benefit of the federal government as a reinsurer.46 With private
insurance companies now offering federally reinsured crop insurance
policies, it is an open question as to whether the Merrill doctrine applies to
a federally reinsured crop insurer. Can waiver and equitable estoppel
claims survive in cases of alleged misrepresentations by FCIC agents and
agents of federally reinsured crop insurance companies? Waiver and
equitable estoppel claims have a longstanding presence not only in
insurance law, but in North Dakota law as well.
B. DOCTRINE OF WAIVER
The doctrine of waiver is commonly defined as encompassing
situations in which an individual or party intentionally or voluntarily waives
a known right.47 An insurer or insurer’s agent can exercise a wavier
through express statements or in writing.48 In addition, a waiver might be
implied in the insurance context where an insurer or insurer’s agent “acts in
a manner inconsistent with an intention to enforce strict compliance of the
contested provision . . . and the insured is naturally led to believe that the
right has been intentionally given up.”49 In the area of insurance, an
express or implied waiver of specific policy provisions of the insurance
contract may result if the statements, conduct, and/or written documents of
an insurer or insurer’s agents indicate such a waiver.50 One instance where
waiver may occur in insurance litigation is if an insurer accepts a late
premium payment.51

44. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65 (1984).
45. See Raines v. United States, 12 C1. Ct. 530, 532 (1987).
46. Marzen I, supra note 1, at 626.
47. Jeremy P. Brummond, When Will the Smoke Clear? Application of Waiver and Estoppel
in Missouri Insurance Law, 66 MO. L. REV. 225, 225 (2001) (“Waiver is generally referred to as
the voluntary (or intentional) relinquishment of a known right.”).
48. Id. at 229-30.
49. Brendle v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 515, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
50. 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1144 (2013).
51. Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 620-21 (1996)
[A]lthough a majority of courts have held that coverage under an insurance policy
cannot be created or enlarged by waiver, nevertheless waiver may still be utilized to
preserve existing insurance coverage when . . . an insurer accepts a late premium
payment or ratifies policy coverage in some other manner, although it has legitimate
legal grounds to cancel the policy . . . .
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The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the issue of insurer’s
conditional acceptance of a late premium payment in Hanson v. Cincinnati
Life Insurance Co.52 In Hanson, the beneficiaries of a life insurance policy
appealed a trial court order granting summary judgment to the insurer on
their claim of death benefits under the policy.53 The underlying facts of
Hanson involved a situation where a life insurance policy allegedly lapsed
due to the nonpayment of a premium.54 However, following the lapse, the
insurer reportedly extended a late-payment offer that had an expiration
date.55 While a check was apparently dated by the decedent with a date
prior to the expiration of the offer, the insurer reported it did not receive the
check until after the offer’s expiration.56 Although the insurer allegedly
cashed the premium check, the insurer requested the insured send an
additional premium payment and also complete a request for reinstatement
form since the policy purportedly lapsed.57 The additional premium
payment and request for reinstatement form were apparently not completed
prior to the insured’s death.58
On appeal, the beneficiaries of the decedent contended that the insurer
waived its right to deny coverage under the life insurance policy when it
cashed the check in response to the initial late payment offer.59 In response,
the insurer contended that it conditionally accepted the check and did not
intend to waive the lapse of the policy.60 Upholding the summary judgment
decision for the insurer, the North Dakota Supreme Court found there was
no issue of material fact as to waiver because the insurer’s written
correspondence “unequivocally informed [the insured] that the policy had
‘lapsed,’” among other statements.61 The North Dakota Supreme Court
thusly declared the following rule:
The unconditional acceptance of a premium after the expiration of
a grace period is universally recognized as a waiver of an insurer’s
right to treat a policy as lapsed for nonpayment of the
premium . . . . There is no waiver, however, if the insurer
conditionally accepts and retains a late premium subject to
reinstatement, and the insurer’s acceptance and placement of a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

1997 ND 230, 571 N.W.2d 363.
Id. ¶ 1, 571 N.W.2d at 365.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 571 N.W.2d at 366.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22, 571 N.W.2d at 368.
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check in a suspense account pending reinstatement of the policy
does not constitute a waiver if the acceptance is clearly
conditional.62
In the context of crop insurance, the issue of waiver is one that has
appeared in reported cases to date. Similar to Hanson, at least one court has
faced the issue of whether the acceptance of a late premium payment by the
FCIC on a crop insurance policy constituted a waiver. In Glass v. Federal
Crop Insurance Corp., a Missouri farmer was issued crop insurance
policies for corn and wheat crops in 1979, 1980, and 1981 for himself and
his farming business.63 In order to receive crop insurance for the 1982 crop
year, the insureds were required to pay the premiums due for the 1981 year
on or before October 10, 1981, the termination date for the policies.64
However, this allegedly did not occur, and the FCIC terminated the policies
at issue.65 Apparently, the FCIC accepted late payments of the premiums
on the policies, and the insureds contended that the acceptance of the late
premium payments constituted waiver of denial of coverage for the 1982
crop year.66
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
ruled in favor of the FCIC and rejected the insured’s waiver argument.67
Despite the FCIC’s acceptance of the late premium payments, the court
emphasized the fact that the insureds’ policies terminated and that the only
way insurance coverage could have been reintroduced would be through
reapplication for coverage.68 Interestingly, compared with Hanson, the
insurer conditionally accepted the late premium payment on the life
insurance policy, but in Glass, the FCIC placed no conditional acceptance
on the late premium payments for the crop insurance policies at issue. With
the absence of a waiver and the lack of a conditional acceptance of a late
premium payment in Glass, it might be argued that in cases involving the
waiver doctrine and crop insurance, an insurer’s acceptance of a late
premium payment, by itself, does not constitute circumstances sufficient to
support a finding of a waiver. However, two things must be noted. First,
Glass involved the FCIC’s acceptance of a late premium payment, not a
private crop insurer selling federally reinsured policies.69 Second, the court
62. Id. ¶ 21 (internal citations omitted).
63. 643 F. Supp. 272, 273 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 274.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Although the facts of Glass involved the FCIC’s acceptance of a late premium
payment, it still might be argued that Glass should apply to cases involving federally reinsured
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noted that even if the payments had the effect of continuing the policies for
succeeding years, the insureds could not prevail since the insureds allegedly
did not file an acreage report required by the policies.70 Thus, the alleged
failure of the insureds to satisfy the terms and conditions of the policies
would still defeat coverage and the doctrine of waiver even if the court
found sufficient evidence of a waiver.
Grant Ballard, an attorney who litigates numerous crop insurance
disputes, has noted that arbitration of disputes is often a contractual
requirement in federally reinsured crop insurance policies.71 The issue of a
federally reinsured crop insurer’s waiver of arbitration in a crop insurance
policy was addressed in In re 2000 Sugar Beet Crop Insurance Litigation.72
In the case, a number of growers of sugar beets alleged waiver of arbitration
provisions under multi-peril crop insurance policies.73 The insureds alleged
that both the defendants’ removal of the case from state to federal court and
its filing of a third-party complaint were actions contrary to an intention to
arbitrate the claims.74 The court disagreed, noting that the answers of the
defendants included an affirmative defense of the right to arbitrate,75 and
the court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.76
Finally, one other significant issue that is often litigated in crop
insurance and other insurance cases is whether an insurer or insurer’s agents
can waive specific policy provisions of an insurance contract. Many
standard insurance policies, including crop insurance policies, require an
insured to furnish timely written notice of a loss to an insurer in order for

crop insurers since at the time of the decision-1986-private insurers were operating in the sale of
federally reinsured crop insurance policies.
70. Id. at 275
Even if plaintiffs’ late payments had the effect of continuing the policies to cover
succeeding crop years, plaintiffs still would not prevail. Plaintiffs’ 1982 crop did not
qualify for coverage. Plaintiffs failed to file an acreage report for the crop year 1982
showing zero acreage as required by the policies. This failure also would serve to
terminate the policies.
71. Ballard I, supra note 13, at 539
Arbitration is often required by the terms of the Common Crop Insurance Policy,
under an arbitration clause pertaining to disputes between an insured and the private
insurance provider. The current arbitration provision found within the CCIP provides
that, when a disagreement arises between an insured producer and the insurance
provider that cannot be resolved by mediation, as to ‘any determination’ made by the
insurance provider, ‘the disagreement must be resolved through arbitration in
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.’
72. 228 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2002).
73. Id. at 997.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 999.
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the insurer to initiate an investigation of the claim.77 Spratlin v. Federal
Crop Insurance Corp. involved a situation in which an insured allegedly
did not provide timely written notice of loss to the FCIC relating to a loss of
a soybean crop.78 The crop insurance policy at issue in Spratlin included
such a provision and permitted indemnification by the FCIC to the insured
only if written notice of loss was timely received.79 The insured conceded
that written notice was timely received.80 However, the insured contended
that, since the FCIC paid indemnity on claims in other cases that were
untimely filed, the doctrine of waiver applied.81
The court rejected the insured’s argument, holding the crop insurance
policy at issue clearly outlined the procedure for filing claims of loss and
that the policy stated that “no term or condition of the policy shall be
waived or changed except in writing by a duly authorized representative of
the FCIC.”82 From the text of the court’s decision, it appears that the
insured also fell short of its evidentiary burden on the waiver issue, as the
allegations concerning the FCIC’s payment on other claims that were
untimely filed were apparently supported only by allegations from the face
of the complaint.83 Irrespective of the insured’s evidentiary burden on the
waiver issue, the Spratlin court focused on the observation that the insured
had legal notice of the insurance policy contract provisions as well as the
FCIC’s “rules and regulations regardless of the hardship resulting from
innocent ignorance.”84
In its decision, the court also cited Merrill.85 In articulating one of the
themes of Merrill, the court stated: “The rule, harsh as it may sound, is that
when one deals with the government, he is expected to know the law and
may not rely on the conduct of government agents contrary to law.”86
Significantly, Spratlin demonstrates that courts may apply the Merrill
doctrine in cases involving the doctrine of waiver. In particular, an insured
77. Marc S. Mayerson, Perfecting and Pursuing Liability Insurance Coverage: A Primer
for Policyholders on Complying with Notice Obligations, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 1003, 1004 (1997)
All liability policies contain provisions requiring the policyholder to notify the insurer
of certain potentially covered events. Insurance companies typically argue that
insureds’ compliance with notice provisions is important because prompt notice gives
them the opportunity to investigate occurrences and (potentially) to participate from
the outset in the defense of a claim or suit.
78. 662 F. Supp. 870, 871 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 872.
83. Id. at 871.
84. Id. at 872.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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under a federally reinsured crop insurance policy may claim an agent or
representative of the private crop insurer waived a specific policy provision.
While Merrill’s application to agents and representatives of private crop
insurers on waiver claims is unsettled, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
also operates to estop the actions of agents and representatives of the
government and federally reinsured crop insurers who misrepresent or
mislead insureds concerning facts of insurance policy provisions in crop
insurance claims.
C. DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Federally reinsured private crop insurers may also face claims based on
the doctrine of equitable estoppel in crop insurance litigation. The doctrine
of equitable estoppel, in essence, protects an insured who has reasonably
relied to their detriment based upon the misrepresentations of an insurer or
the insurer’s agents or representatives.87 One treatise has described the
doctrine as “conduct or acts on the part of the insurer which are sufficient to
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the insured that the insurer will not
insist on a compliance with the provisions of the policy and treat the insured
in reliance upon such conduct or acts has changed his or her position to his
or her detriment.”88 While both doctrines are similar, a waiver involves a
relinquishment of a right and estoppel may arise even in a situation where
the person or entity has no intention of relinquishing or changing a right.89
In North Dakota, the Legislature has enacted a statute that codifies the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. The statute defines the doctrine as follows:
“When a party, by that party’s own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately has led another to believe a particular thing
true and to act upon such belief, that party shall not be permitted to falsify it
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission.”90
The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the doctrine of estoppel
in the insurance context in D.E.M. v. Allickson.91 The underlying case
involved sexual misconduct allegations by a couple against the pastor of a
87. ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 152
(5th ed. 2012)
Whatever the doctrine of waiver is, the doctrine of estoppel is closely related to it.
The doctrine of estoppel essentially requires two elements: an actual misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance. Misrepresentations, when they occur, are often attributable
to the activities of agents, who mislead the insured as to the nature of coverage. The
insured must rely on this misrepresentation in some way.
88. 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1144 (2013).
89. John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent Waiver” of Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating
the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 271-72 (1995).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06 (2013).
91. 555 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1996).
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church.92 After the church was made aware of the claims, the church
notified its insurer of the possibility that a lawsuit may be filed based upon
alleged sexual misconduct.93 In a written letter to the church, the insurer
declined insurance coverage for the claims based upon an exclusion in the
church’s policy for sexual misconduct claims.94 It later was revealed such
an exclusion did not exist in the policy.95
After a settlement was reached in the underlying tort case, a MillerShugart agreement96 was reached, which permitted the plaintiffs to directly
pursue collection on the judgment against the church’s insurer.97 Once the
plaintiffs sought recovery of the agreement against the insurer, the insurer
invoked lack of sufficient notice concerning claims of a “bodily injury” as a
defense to the duty to defend and indemnify the church.98
The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected the insurer’s argument.99
Invoking the rule that an insurer who denies coverage on one ground and
then later denies coverage on a different ground is estopped from raising the
latter ground if the insured is prejudiced,100 the court held it would be
“grossly unjust and unfair to allow [the insurer] to escape liability upon the
unasserted lack of notice.”101
Another area in which the law of insurance intersects with the doctrine
of equitable estoppel is in cases involving insurance by estoppel.
Professors Jerry and Richmond note that some courts are hesitant to apply
the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel to expand coverage where

92. Id. at 597.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 597-98.
95. Id. at 598.
96. Jerome Abrams, Failure to Allocate? Nobody Pays: Using Miller Shugart Settlements
in Cases of Questionable Insurance Coverage, 4 WM. MITCHELL J. L. & PRAC. 2 (2010).
Judge Abrams states:
The Miller-Shugart scenario plays out as follows: 1) some incident takes place
which gives rise to a claim against a policyholder; 2) the policyholder provides
notice to its insurer that they want the insurer to handle the claim, usually
invoking both the defense and indemnification duties under the policy; 3) the
insurer questions or even denies the claim for reasons it explains; 4) the
policyholder fearing personal liability – or at least uninsured exposure – makes a
deal to settle the claim solely recoverable from the insurance coverage which
arguably covers the claim; 5) the final paperwork allows the claimant to have a
judgment against the policyholder collectible form the insurance coverage if it is
established. Id.
97. D.E.M, 555 N.W.2d at 598.
98. Id. at 599.
99. Id. at 601.
100. Id. at 600.
101. Id. at 601.
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none exists.102 The question of whether to extend coverage in an insurance
contract by estoppel arose in North Dakota in Wangler v. Lerol.103 In
Wangler, the underlying facts of the case involved an employee of a
company engaged in turkey farming who filed a negligence claim against
the employer.104 However, the company involved in the turkey farming
operation was not a named insured under a farm liability policy in effect,
and insurance coverage was not available for the plaintiff.105 In relying on
an affidavit of one of the owners of the company, the plaintiff contended
insurance by estoppel was available in the case since the owner apparently
asked “Now, we’re covered aren’t we?” to his insurance agent following
one of the company’s annual insurance reviews.106
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the plaintiff’s evidence was not
enough to create a fact question on insurance by estoppel.107 The court
noted that the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff gave no indication as to
the response of the insurance agent, nor did it indicate any evidence of
conduct by the insurance agent or insurer that would lead the insured to an
incorrect belief concerning the insurance coverage available for the turkey
farming operation.108
In the context of crop insurance, the doctrines of waiver and equitable
estoppel may work in favor of farmer insureds to prevent federally
reinsured crop insurers from benefiting from inconsistent statements,
conduct, or their own misrepresentations. But, as noted earlier, the Merrill
doctrine has a strong foothold in United States jurisprudence. After private
insurers entered the business of federally reinsured crop insurance in the
1980s, courts soon faced the question of whether Merrill should be
extended beyond the statement(s), conduct, and actions of government
representatives or agents to the statement(s), conduct, and actions of
representatives or agents of federally reinsured crop insurers to bar waiver
and equitable estoppel claims.

102. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 87, at 154 (“Some courts have held that the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to expand the coverage of policies, which is to be
distinguished from using the doctrine to prevent rescission of a policy or a defense to a claim
within coverage.”).
103. 2003 ND 164, 670 N.W.2d 830.
104. Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 832.
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶ 15, 670 N.W.2d at 834.
107. Id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 835.
108. Id. ¶ 15.
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III. THE MERRILL DOCTRINE: DOES IT APPLY TO FEDERALLY
REINSURED PRIVATE CROP INSURERS?
The applicability of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured private
crop insurers is a critical issue in crop insurance litigation. Application of
the doctrine essentially bars the waiver and estoppel claims of farmer
insureds in the crop insurance context. Two early federal courts, the United
States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Mann v. Federal Crop
Insurance Corp.109 and the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina in Walpole v. Great American Insurance Companies,110
endorsed application of the Merrill doctrine. However, this early trend
applying Merrill changed with the decisions of three state courts in the
early 2000s which rejected the application of Merrill: the Supreme Court
of Kentucky in Dailey v. American Growers Insurance,111 the Court of
Appeals of Georgia in Rain & Hail Insurance Services v. Vickery,112 and
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in Simms v. Insurance Co. of North
America.113 Most recently, the decision of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop
Insurance Corp.114 revived the applicability of Merrill to federally
reinsured crop insurers and indicates a true modern split has occurred
concerning the application of the doctrine. The resolution of this split in
cases has significant implications for the future crop insurance claims of
farmer insureds who assert the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel in
litigation.
A. EARLY DECISIONS UPHOLDING MERRILL: MANN V. FEDERAL
CROP INSURANCE CORP. AND WALPOLE V. GREAT
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
The issue of the Merrill doctrine’s applicability to private insurers
arose after the FCIA extended the writing of federal crop insurance policies
to private insurers in the 1980s. One of the first major cases addressing the
application of Merrill in a crop insurance litigation context was Mann v.
Federal Crop Insurance Corp.115 It should be noted that Mann involved
the alleged representations of an FCIC insurance agent and field adjustment
supervisor and not any agent or representative of a private insurer. In
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983).
914 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Va. 1996).
103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003).
618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005).
No. 4:09-cv-65, 2012 WL 1193407, at *12-13 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2012).
710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983).
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Mann, the plaintiffs and FCIC disputed the total monetary amount due
under a policy covering the plaintiffs’ peanut crop.116 The plaintiffs
contended they were entitled to keep proceeds they received following the
sale of the peanut crop that were above the support price, while the FCIC
contended that federal regulations required profits above the support price
to be offset by any crop insurance proceeds.117
One of the plaintiffs’ main arguments was that the FCIC was estopped
from offsetting any profits above the support price because agents of the
FCIC allegedly represented that “bonuses” would not count toward the
FCIC computation of loss.118 The FCIC agents also apparently admitted
that the statements were made, but they noted that the statements were
meant to refer to a “seed and drayage” bonus that had been payable in the
past and were not meant to include “bonuses” that referred to profits above
the support price of a crop.119 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the plaintiffs’ estoppel theory.120 In its holding, the Fourth Circuit focused
on the fact that the FCIC valued the loss according to the terms and
conditions of the policy, and it noted that the “farmer is charged with
knowledge of the regulation and the policy.”121
Approximately a decade after Mann, in 1994, the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina extended the application of Merrill
to a federally reinsured private crop insurer in Walpole v. Great American
Insurance Companies.122 Walpole presented a dispute between farmer
insureds and private insurers concerning the amount of an indemnity under
a multi-peril crop insurance policy.123 In the case, the farmer insureds lost a
part of their tomato crop due to a July 1992 storm and then later sold the
weather-damaged tomatoes that were picked.124
The multi-peril federally reinsured crop insurance policy at issue
provided insurance coverage until the completion of the harvest. 125 The
plaintiffs denied they “harvested” the remaining tomato crop after the
storm, but argued they had “salvaged” it instead.126 In response, the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
914 F. Supp. 1283 (D.S.C. 1994).
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
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insurers contended that all the marketed tomatoes picked were required to
be counted as an offset against the indemnity due under the policy.127
After analyzing the language of the policy, the court held that all
tomatoes picked and sold from the tomato crop counted as “harvested”
production, not “salvaged.”128 The court noted that if the tomatoes were
“picked,” as what happened in the case, then they are “harvested,” and the
court also emphasized that the drafters of the policy did not include the
word “salvage” in any documents.129 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’
estoppel argument.130 The plaintiffs had contended that adjusters of the
insurers allegedly “told Plaintiffs to go ahead and harvest and they would
be back with the checkbook.”131 The court not only disagreed with the
plaintiffs’ estoppel argument, but it also appeared to assume that even if it
could be argued that such statements were misleading, the “statements
cannot be applied to extend coverage where there is none because the
doctrine of estoppel does not extend coverage beyond that authorized by the
policy.”132 In applying Merrill to the conduct of a private crop insurer,133
the court essentially appeared to imply that even if representations or
misrepresentations were made by the agents of the insurer, such
representations “cannot vary the clear terms of the policy.”134 Despite
Walpole extending the rules of Merrill and Mann so as to essentially shield
private insurers who issue federally reinsured crop insurance policies from
waiver and equitable estoppel claims, the early rule extending Merrill to
private insurers was eclipsed approximately a decade later by the decisions
of three state courts in Kentucky, Georgia and Tennessee.
B. THE MERRILL DOCTRINE CHALLENGED: DAILEY V. AMERICAN
GROWERS INSURANCE, RAIN & HAIL INSURANCE SERVICES V.
VICKERY, AND SIMMS V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Kentucky became the first court to
challenge the application of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured crop
insurers when it decided Dailey v. American Growers Insurance.135 In
127. Id. at 1289.
128. Id. at 1288.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1290.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12901-91. The court in Walpole cited both Mann and Merrill in its decision. In
footnote 12, the court noted that “that the Merrill and Mann holdings are equally applicable to
FCIC reinsured policies, as well as FCIC directly issued policies.” Id. at 1290 n.12.
134. Id. at 1291.
135. 103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003).
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Dailey, a Kentucky tobacco farmer brought a number of state law claims,
primarily under the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act,
against a private crop insurer.136 The heart of the dispute, like many other
disputes involving crop insurance and the Merrill doctrine, involved a
question as to the proper percentage of an indemnity to be paid for a crop
loss. The tobacco farmer contended the coverage level was 75%, while the
private crop insurer argued coverage should have been available at the 55%
level.137 In Dailey, the agent of the private crop insurer apparently assisted
with the issuance of a federally reinsured crop insurance policy in the
personal name of the insured in 1995 and then assisted with the issuance of
a crop insurance policy in the name of an unincorporated business entity in
1996.138 After a tobacco crop loss in 1996, the private crop insurer denied
coverage on the 1996 policy, which provided for 75% coverage of the
tobacco crop, on the basis that the unincorporated business entity was not
insurable and transferred coverage to the 1995 policy, which provided for
the lower 55% indemnity.139
The trial court granted summary judgment to the crop insurer largely
on the basis that it found that multi-peril crop insurance policies are subject
to FCIC regulations, and thus any state law claims were preempted.140 The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held the claims were not preempted
by the FCIA or FCIC regulations.141 Significantly, a majority of the
Kentucky Supreme Court also delivered a sweeping concurrence on the
issue of the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private crop
insurers.
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the private crop insurer
contended that the insured’s estoppel claim was barred by the Merrill
doctrine.142 Under the facts of the case, the agent of the private crop
insurer, not the insured, apparently completed the application form and
drafted the application in the insureds personal name in 1995 and the name
of the unincorporated business entity in 1996.143 In addition, the testimony
revealed that the agent also apparently instigated the process to obtain
higher insurance coverage levels on the tobacco crop.144 It also appeared
from the text of Dailey that there was no evidence that the insured failed to
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. (Cooper, J., concurring).
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 70.
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exercise due diligence concerning the application process or that an in pari
delicto145 type of situation existed with the case.
In finding that the insured had a colorable estoppel claim, the Kentucky
Supreme Court not only closely surveyed the factual allegations
surrounding the case, but also examined the very purpose of the Merrill
doctrine itself. The Kentucky Supreme Court remarked that one of the
important aspects of the Merrill doctrine is that it upholds the doctrine of
separation of powers in that “judge-made principles such as estoppel should
not be applied to open the public coffers when Congress has explicitly
ordered them closed.”146 The Kentucky Supreme Court also noted that
when a private insurance company is involved, separation of powers is not
an issue at all.147 Furthermore, the court in Dailey also compared the FCIA
to the federal flood insurance program and the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968 (“NFIA”).148 The Dailey court observed that under the NFIA,
private insurers are designated “fiscal agents” of the United States,149 but
under the statutory language of the FCIA, private insurers are not deemed to
be “fiscal agents” of the United States, so separation of powers concerns are
not present with federally reinsured crop insurance companies.150 Finally,
the Dailey court also analogized the FCIC and federally reinsured crop
insurers to the private insurers that comprise the Foreign Credit Insurance
Association.151 The Dailey court noted that two United States federal
circuit courts of appeal, the Eleventh Circuit152 and the Third Circuit,153
rejected application of the Merrill doctrine to the Foreign Credit Insurance
Association.154
Approximately two years later, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
followed the Dailey decision in Rain & Hail Insurance Services v.
145. Black’s Law Dictionary defines in pari delicto as “equally at fault.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 806 (8th ed. 2004).
146. Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 69.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012).
150. Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 69.
151. Id. at 70 (“The Foreign Credit Insurance Association . . . is a collection of private
insurance companies formed at the behest of the United States Export-Import Bank . . . to provide
insurance for foreign commercial ventures.”). Law review articles addressing the Foreign Credit
Insurance Association in more detail include Robert Chapman, The High Utility of FCIA
Insurance to Banks in Financing Trade, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439 (1986); Karen
Hudes, Protecting Against Inconvertibility and Transfer Risk: An Outline of Trade Financing
Programs of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
461 (1986); S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MIGA, Eximbank and
Other Providers, 5 PACE INT’L L. REV. 59 (1993).
152. Nu-Air Mfg. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. of N.Y., 822 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1987).
153. Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 777 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985).
154. Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 70.
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Vickery.155 In Vickery, a private crop insurer denied the insureds’ claims
for prevented planting losses on the basis that the insureds did not comply
with the federally reinsured multi-peril crop insurance policies by
submitting an “intended acreage report” to the insurer with their application
for insurance.156 The insureds contended in response that they reasonably
relied upon the representations of an agent of the private insurer who
reportedly informed them that a personal production history would suffice
for the application.157 The policy in question provided that its provisions
could “not be waived by any crop insurance agent.”158
The trial court denied summary judgment to the private crop insurer on
the insureds’ equitable estoppel claim.159 In upholding the trial court’s
denial of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a
fact issue remained as to whether the insureds reasonably relied upon the
agent’s representations.160 In its decision, the Court of Appeals cited Dailey
and noted that, because the claim at issue did not “represent a direct claim
on the public treasury,” the Merrill doctrine did not apply.161
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee has also limited the
applicability of Merrill to private crop insurers. In the 2005 Simms v.
Insurance Co. of North America decision, a Tennessee trial court granted
summary judgment to a private crop insurer against the claims of an insured
who allegedly failed to follow the loss provisions of a multi-peril crop
insurance policy after suffering a tobacco crop loss.162 The private insurer
argued that it denied coverage on the basis that the insured destroyed the
tobacco crop before the insurer had an opportunity to appraise the crop
loss.163
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that a fact issue
existed on the insured’s estoppel and waiver claims.164 Testimony at the
trial court level apparently revealed that an agent of the private crop insurer
instructed the insured to proceed to “bush hog” the tobacco crop after the
insured reported the loss.165 In its decision, the Simms court not only cited

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
2005).
163.
164.
165.

618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 116-17.
No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.

2013]

THE MERRILL DOCTRINE

607

Dailey and Vickery,166 but also cited the principle that courts should
construe insurance policy provisions relating to coverage in favor of the
insured.167 The Court of Appeals found an issue of fact even though the
insured apparently did not include a provision in an affidavit stating that he
reasonably relied on the agent’s representations.168 But the recent decision
of another court in Tennessee, this time a federal court, jeopardizes the
developing rule that the Merrill doctrine does not preclude waiver and
equitable estoppel claims against federally reinsured private crop insurers.
C. MERRILL REVIVED? SKYMONT FARMS V. FEDERAL
CROP INSURANCE CORP.
In Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee breathed life into the
Merrill doctrine’s applicability to private insurers.169 The underlying facts
of the Skymont Farms case involved the denial of a crop insurance claim
following an August 2006 hailstorm on the basis the insured did not have an
insurable interest in the crop.170 The private insurer contended that the
insured did not have a 100% ownership or insurable interest in the land at
issue as noted in the application, and it argued that since this occurred, the
policy could be properly voided on the basis of material
misrepresentation.171
In the case, it appeared that the insurer issued the policy without
inspecting the crops or noting any problems with the application for
insurance.172 In addition, the adjuster of the insurer apparently identified no
problems while initially adjusting the claim.173 However, the Skymont
Farms court adopted the principles of Merrill to bar the estoppel claims of
the insured.174
In examining Skymont Farms, one can differentiate the case from
Dailey, Vickery, and Simms. In all three of those cases, it appeared that
there was no solid evidence that the insureds’ failed to exercise due
diligence concerning the claims nor did they allegedly commit any arguably
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *6 (“We further find that a reasonable construction of the insurance policy in
favor of providing coverage to the insured yields the conclusion that preserving a representative
sample of the failed crop would not necessarily in all cases be required.”).
168. Id.
169. No. 4:09–cv–65, 2012 WL 1193407 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).
170. Id. at *1.
171. Id. at *1, *7-10.
172. Id. at *12.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *13.
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negligent acts themselves. But in Skymont Farms, the court voided the
policy on the basis of misrepresentation.175 Therefore, the court reasoned
that to allow coverage under estoppel when it was otherwise voided “would
contravene the prohibition against estoppel.”176
Skymont Farms leaves the future application of the Merrill doctrine to
federally reinsured crop insurers in unsettled waters. Future courts can
resolve this key question by applying a strong presumption against the
application of Merrill, but with exceptions.
IV. PROPOSAL
Courts examining the issue of applying Merrill to the conduct of agents
of federally reinsured crop insurance companies are faced with addressing
two primary policy considerations. On the one hand, there is a general duty
for all who enter into contractual arrangements to read the documents that
they sign.177 Whether or not this general duty exists with insurance
contracts is ambiguous,178 but, as a general policy matter, insureds should
have at least some semblance of a duty to investigate policy provisions of
federally reinsured crop insurance contracts.
However, on the other hand, as a policy matter farmer insureds should
be able to place at least some level of trust and confidence in the agent of a
federally reinsured private crop insurer. Such a duty should not arise to the
level of a fiduciary relationship,179 but there should at least be some level of
a duty of fair dealing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight
Circuit described such a level of good faith of FCIC agents in 1985 in
A.W.G. Farms Inc. v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. as follows:
While we do not hold the government liable under an estoppel
theory . . . the factual background regarding the FCIC’s course of
dealing with these growers must be considered under basic
principles of good faith and fairness . . . . One may have to turn
‘square corners’ when dealing with a governmental entity, but this

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
That is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 729 (2008) (“The duty to read contracts is a well
-recognized common law doctrine, which holds contracting parties responsible for the written
terms of a contract, whether or not they actually read them. This doctrine is primarily aimed at
achieving stability and promoting reliance upon contracts.”).
178. James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is Indispensable, If We
Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 165 (1998).
179. Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 12 (2004).
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does not mean the government may operate so recklessly so as to
put parties dealing with it entirely at its mercy.180
The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
approvingly quoted this language in 1999, but also noted that even though
the “FCIC may not be estopped by representations that subsequently prove
inaccurate, it surely cannot seek refuge behind the technicalities of offer and
acceptance unique to insurance law, nor the rules of liability governing
common law reinsurance arrangements, in order to escape its
obligations.”181 Such a principle should apply to federally reinsured private
crop insurance providers as well, particularly since they are afforded
specific protection in the form of reinsurance by the federal government.182
To balance both the insureds’ duty to investigate policy provisions, the
insurer’s duty of good faith in the context of federally reinsured crop
insurance policies, and the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel is a
difficult endeavor. One approach is the adoption of a rule where Merrill
would not apply in cases of “affirmative misconduct” by the agents of a
private crop insurer, and in limited cases courts have allowed equitable
estoppel claims against the government where “affirmative misconduct” is
found.183 But the drawback of the “affirmative misconduct” exception is
that it typically involves claims against the government and not those
against private entities.
One rule that could balance both the interests of farmer insureds and
federally reinsured private crop insurers is as follows: (1) That a heavy
presumption against the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private
crop insurers be followed; and (2) that Merrill only apply when a federally
reinsured private crop insurer makes a “clear and convincing” evidentiary
showing that the farmer insured failed to adequately investigate the
provisions concerning a crop insurance policy, or when there is a “clear and
convincing” evidentiary showing that the insured made a fraudulent
misrepresentation on an application for insurance. The “clear and
convincing” evidentiary standard would retain the application of Merrill to
the exceptional cases rather than the general rule that developed in Dailey,
Vickery and Simms, but yet reserve its application for cases in which it is
“highly probable” that the insured(s) failed to take action to properly

180. 757 F.2d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1985).
181. Wiley v. Glickman, No. A3-99-32, 1999 WL 33283312, at *13 (D.N.D. 1999).
182. Marzen I, supra note 1, at 651.
183. Alan I. Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of its Agents That Are Not
Specifically Authorized: The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J.
775, 789 (2003) (noting several reported cases).
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investigate crop insurance policy provisions.184 The adoption of this rule by
the courts would adequately balance the interests of both federally reinsured
private crop insurers and farmer insureds, help to provide a fair playing
field for all in the crop insurance industry, and provide a workable objective
standard to examine each unique fact pattern on a case-by-case basis.
V. CONCLUSION
The very economic livelihood of thousands of farmers is implicated by
the existence of a vital federal crop insurance program. 185 It is likely that a
notable number of cases involving questions of coverage under federally
reinsured crop insurance policies are amicably resolved without litigation.
But in some cases, allegations of misrepresentations as to the amount of or
nature of coverage may arise. It is difficult to balance competing claims of
both a federally reinsured crop insurer and a farmer insured. On the one
hand, a federally reinsured crop insurer is likely to claim that it should be
able to completely rely upon the provision of a policy concerning coverage.
On the other hand, a farmer insured is likely to claim that he or she should
be able to operate free from any misrepresentations of the agents or
representatives of private insurers.
That balance is best preserved by the courts applying a heavy
presumption against application of the Merrill doctrine. Farmer insureds
who conduct due diligence concerning the provisions of a crop insurance
policy, as a policy matter, should not have their waiver and equitable
estoppel claims against private insurers quashed by the Merrill doctrine.
The only time Merrill should apply is when the private crop insurer makes a
“clear and convincing” evidentiary showing that the farmer insured failed to
adequately investigate the provisions concerning a crop insurance policy.
The adoption by the courts of such a rule in future cases involving Merrill
adequately balances both the interests and objectives of federally reinsured
private crop insurers and farmer insureds.

184. Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search
for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 462
(2002):
Between the normal civil standard and the criminal standard lies an intermediate civil
standard, variously formulated by the courts but most often described as a standard of
clear and convincing evidence. Despite this description, the clear and convincing
evidence standard does not refer to the quantity or kind of evidence presented, but to
the apparent probability that the assertion is true: the party with the burden of proof
must convince the trier of fact that it is highly probable that the facts he alleges are
correct.
185. See generally Marzen I, supra note 1; Marzen II, supra note 3.

